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I. Introduction and Research Motivation 
 This study seeks to further examine the connection between executive-auditor 
relationship and the occurrence of fraudulent accounting.  This has been a contentious 
issue in the field of accounting for many years, but came into the spotlight after the 
meltdowns of companies like Enron and WorldCom in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
At the core of these disasters was, at the very least, questionable accounting and, in many 
cases, accounting fraud.1  In some cases, independent auditors turned a blind eye to 
blatantly inaccurate and misleading financial statements which deceived investors, 
regulators, and the general public.  These deceived parties rapidly became fixated on the 
relationship between the companies and their independent auditors who signed off on 
their fraudulent financial statements.  Questions surfaced about the nature of their 
relationship: Can you reasonably expect an auditing company that is employed by a firm 
to disagree with the firm’s management decisions?  Was the economic bond between the 
companies so strong that auditors would ignore their professional duties in exchange for 
continued business and/or higher fees from the company?  Could anything be changed 
about the accounting profession to ensure that such events could never occur again?  
Some felt that the system needed reform in order to proceed.2  Other people felt that the 
rules in place were adequate—Enron and other companies just failed to follow the rules.3   
 In response to public outrage about the accounting scandals of the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the government made several changes with regard to company-auditor 
                                                          
1
  D. A. Moore, "Conflicts of Interest and the Case of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction and Strategic 
Issue Cycling," The Academy of Management Review 31, no. 1 (2006), 10. 
2
  Mark W. Nelson, "Ameliorating Conflicts of Interest in Auditing: Effects of Recent Reforms on Auditors 
and their Clients," ((July 11, 2005).). 
3
  A. H. Catanach, "Enron: A Financial Reporting Failure," Villanova Law Review 48, no. 4 (2003), 1057. 
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relationship.  In 2000, Congress mandated the issuance of a proxy statement which 
disclosed the type and amount of fees paid to independent auditors.4  In November 2000, 
the SEC introduced Final Rule S7-13-00 which sought to alter auditor independence 
requirements.  The new Rules defined independence as “a mental state of objectivity and 
lack of bias” and demanded that the auditor be independent both “in fact” and “in 
appearance”.5  There were four considerations for determining independence.  
Independence was said to be impaired when: “1) the auditor has mutual or conflicting 
interest with the audit client; 2) the auditor audits the auditor’s own work; 3) the auditor 
functions as management or an employee of the audit client; or 4) the auditor acts as an 
advocate for the audit client”.6  Many felt that these measures were not sufficient to 
prevent future crises, so Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter referred to as 
SOX or the Act) in July of 2002.  SOX is widely considered the most sweeping financial 
regulation legislation since the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.7  The Act introduces a 
number of rules and makes several rules in place considerably stricter.  Some of the 
changes include: Harsher penalties for executives that sign off on inaccurate statements, 
incentives and protection for “whistleblowers”, and new rules for firm-auditor 
relationship.8  Many academics and experts felt that the government acted too quickly 
and without first attempting to determine the problems at the root of the accounting 
scandals; they felt SOX was “hastily put together in response to several high-profile 
                                                          
4
  Marshall A. M. A. Geiger, "Auditor Tenure and Audit Reporting Failures." Auditing 21, no. 1 (2002), 67. 
5
  Richard M. Frankel et al., The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings 
Quality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Sloan School of Management, 2002), 4. 
6
  ibid., 4 
7
  I. X. Zhang, "Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002," Journal of Accounting & 
Economics 44, no. 1-2 (2007), 75. 
8
  J. R. Macey, "A Pox on both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the 
Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules," Washington University Law Quarterly 81, no. 2 
(2003), 350-353. 
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corporate scandals”.9  The new rules concerning client-auditor relationship are most 
relevant to this study.   
Under the new rules, audit firms are prohibited from working with a firm if one of the 
firm’s executives was employed by the auditing firm “during a one-year period preceding 
the date of the initiation of the audit”.10  Additionally, the new regulations include rules 
requiring the mandatory rotation of independent auditors.  Policy makers suspected that a 
lengthy relationship between the firm and the auditor would cause them to form a strong 
bond—and auditor professionalism and independence would be compromised.11  A final 
relevant provision of SOX puts new restrictions on receiving services from the auditor 
and forbids the auditor from providing certain consultancy services and some other 
services for an audit client.  Under the new rules, any fees for non-audit services greater 
than five percent of the total fees paid to the auditor must be pre-approved by the 
company’s audit committee.12  Again, law makers and the general public believed that 
the economic bond between the two parties had become too strong and that the large 
amounts of fees for non-audit services were partly to blame.13     
The three variables examined in this study were audit fees, fees for other services, and 
length of executive-auditor relationship.  Audit fees refer to fees directly related to the 
audit of the company by the independent auditing firm.  Fees for other services refer to 
                                                          
9
  C. C. Leuz, "Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 really this Costly? A Discussion of Evidence from Event 
Returns and Going-Private Decisions," Journal of Accounting & Economics 44, no. 1-2 (2007), 147. 
10
  Macey, A Pox on both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative 
Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 352 
11
  J. V. Carcello, "Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting," Auditing 23, no. 2 (2004), 2-3. 
12
  Lawrence L. J. Abbott, "An Empirical Investigation of Audit Fees, Nonaudit Fees, and Audit 
Committees*," Contemporary Accounting Research 20, no. 2 (2003), 219. 
13
  Macey, A Pox on both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative 
Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 352 
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any fees billed by the auditor for anything other than the audit.  Firms were required to 
disclose the first two variables in proxy statements after fiscal year 2000.  The intuition 
behind the selection of these variables was that they are all possible indicators of the 
strength of relationship and economic bond between the firm and its auditor.  The fees 
may be the fair value of the work performed by the auditor, but it is also possible that a 
firm which pays its auditor high fees may be reimbursing the auditor for their stamp of 
approval on inaccurate financial statements.    
There are opposing theoretical arguments about the effects of these different variables 
on auditor independence and therefore the issuance of accurate and honest financial 
statements.  Much of the literature in this area focuses on the fees for non-audit services 
but much of this argument can be extended to audit fees as well.  One side of the 
argument contends that auditors’ decisions are certainly influenced by the fees paid to 
them by their clients.  An auditing firm retains business with a firm by pleasing the firm’s 
management and the audit team accomplishes this by agreeing with the internal audit 
team.  Additionally, an auditor with a strong economic bond with their client—caused by 
high fees—will have a vested interest in the success of the company and this could cause 
“impaired auditor independence”.14  Former chairman of the SEC Arthur Levitt expressed 
his concern with the situation in 2000.  He was afraid that consulting and other services 
from the independent auditor “shorten the distance between the auditor and 
management”.15  Levitt also commented that the “broad array of business arrangements” 
(in addition to a simple audit) could make the auditor less of a “skeptical professional 
                                                          
14
  Michael M. Firth, "The Provision of Nonaudit Services by Accounting Firms to their Audit Clients," 
Contemporary Accounting Research 14, no. 2 (1997), 7. 
15
  Abbott, An Empirical Investigation of Audit Fees, Nonaudit Fees, and Audit Committees*, 219 
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who must be satisfied before signing off on a financial statement, and more like any other 
service vendor who must satisfy the client to make a sale”.16  Concern in this area is not 
limited to Arthur Levitt.  Professor Michael Firth discusses two reasons why non-audit 
fees threaten the independence of the auditor:  
“1) the audit firm is unwilling to ‘criticize’ the work done by its consultancy division, 
and 2) the audit firm does not want to lose lucrative consultancy services […] and is 
therefore more reluctant to disagree with management’s interpretation of accounting 
matters”.17 
 The counter argument asserts that there is no connection between fees paid to the 
auditor and the occurrence of accounting fraud—and argues that higher fees may in fact 
lead to lower likelihood of accounting fraud in some situations.  They assert that one 
would expect high audit fees, when company size and complexity is controlled for, to be 
correlated with a lower occurrence of accounting fraud.  This is because larger amount of 
fees implies that the auditor spent more time and effort in examining the financial 
statements and therefore they are more likely to catch errors.  Similarly, they would argue 
that high fees for other services from the auditor are also less likely to lead to accounting 
fraud.  These fees are an indication of the auditor’s increased knowledge of the firm and 
therefore they are more likely to issue accurate statements the first time.18  In effect, there 
is a positive “knowledge externality” created when the auditor provides joint services for 
                                                          
16
  M. A. Geiger, "Audit Fees, Nonaudit Fees, and Auditor Reporting on Stressed Companies." Auditing 22, 
no. 2 (2003), 55. 
17
  Firth, The Provision of Nonaudit Services by Accounting Firms to their Audit Clients, 7 
18
  Anup A. Agrawal, "Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals*," The Journal of Law & Economics 
48, no. 2 (2005), 377. 
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the client.19  These arguments only defend the fees assuming that restatements occur 
because of honest mistakes by the firm and auditor, but this side of the argument also 
accommodates the possibility that the mistakes were purposeful.  For example, an 
independent auditor receiving a high amount of fees for other services will not want to 
risk the possibility of losing this client.  Essentially, they have a “good thing going for 
them” and do not want to lose it by approving a statement which they know to be 
incorrect.20  Additionally, some have argued that firms will naturally keep their level of 
other fees from their auditor at an appropriate level because they know the public will be 
concerned about the appearance of non-independence.21    
This argument extends to the issue of length of relationship between the executive 
and the auditor.  One could argue that a) a longer relationship between the two firms 
would increase the auditor’s knowledge of the firm and therefore it is less likely that they 
will miss inaccurate information in the financial statements and b) clients are difficult to 
obtain and retain and therefore a company would not want to risk losing a long-term 
client (either by action of clients pressured to distance themselves from auditor or by 
action of the government) by approving a financial statement they know to contain false 
information.22  It is also possible that, under mandatory rotation rules, auditors will feel 
stronger pressure to “capitulate to clients’ wishes” because the new rules will lead to 
“intra-firm rivalries among accountants, as new accountants compete for higher client 
satisfaction survey results than their predecessors [who didn’t have to follow the new 
                                                          
19
  Dan A. D. A. Simunic, "Auditing, Consulting, and Auditor Independence," Journal of Accounting 
Research 22, no. 2 (1984), 680. 
20
  Michael M. Firth, "Auditor-Provided Consultancy Services and their Associations with Audit Fees and 
Audit Opinions," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 29, no. 5&6 (2002), 663. 
21
  Frankel et al., The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings Quality, 26 
22
  Abbott, An Empirical Investigation of Audit Fees, Nonaudit Fees, and Audit Committees*, 221 
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rules]”.23  A former SEC Chairman, Roderick Hill, shared his opinion with the United 
States Senate during 2002: 
“Forcing a change of auditors can only lower the quality of audits and increase their 
costs. The longer an auditor is with a company the more it learns about its personnel, its 
business and its intrinsic values. To change [auditors] every several years will simply 
create a merry-go-round of mediocrity”.24 
Some argue that the auditor’s decision to approve a false statement is essentially a 
cost-benefit analysis and is self-governing in that the costs almost always outweigh the 
benefits.  The costs in this case include loss of reputation, lawsuits, and possible 
restrictions by the SEC concerning future conduct; the benefits include retaining business 
and possibly receiving higher fees from the client.25  Loss of reputation in the industry, or 
“reputational capital” is devastating and therefore the auditor will not want to “jeopardize 
it to satisfy the demands of any one client”.26  Reputation is extremely hard to establish 
and makes the auditor more professionally appealing to clients who want to demonstrate 
to investors and the government that they are trustworthy and accurately audited.  The 
auditor’s reputation, in the opinion of one author, is essentially “serves as a collateral 
bond for independence”.27 
                                                          
23
  Macey, A Pox on both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative 
Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 353 
24
  Carcello, Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 3 
25
  Abbott, An Empirical Investigation of Audit Fees, Nonaudit Fees, and Audit Committees*, 221 
26
  R. M. Frankel, "The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management," 
The Accounting Review 77 (2002), 72. 
27
  Mason Gerety and Kenneth - Lehn, - the Causes and Consequences of Accounting Fraud, Vol. - 18: - 
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., - 1997), 590. 
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 This study provides increased and unique investigation into this area of concern.  
The restatements included in this study come within a pivotal period for accounting 
practice in the United States.  Starting with fiscal year 2000, firms were required to 
disclose the amount they paid their independent auditor in audit fees and fees for other 
services.  The U.S. Government did not require disclosure of audit fees, audit-related 
fees, tax services, information technology services, and non-audit services before this 
year.28  The most recent cases used were from fiscal year 2002.  Events after this date 
were not used because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in June, 2002.  This act was 
directed at some of the alleged causes of accounting fraud addressed in this empirical 
study, including independent auditor tenure and fees for audits and non-audit services.  
The act did not take effect until the first fiscal year-end report after November 15, 200429, 
so feasibly this study could have included events from fiscal year 2003.  This study chose 
to exclude events from this year, however, because it is very possible that firms, 
conscious of the regulations and in anticipation of the act taking effect, would alter their 
behavior for this fiscal year. (Further study could determine whether this in fact was the 
case).   
 Additionally, this study approaches the length of relationship in a novel way.  
Instead of using the independent auditor’s length of relationship with the firm, this study 
defines tenure as the length of relationship between the executive at the firm and the 
independent auditing firm.  This approach was prompted by the idea that independent 
auditors’ level of comfort with a company is determined by their interaction with the 
management of the firm.  This study is important for several reasons.  As mentioned 
                                                          
28
  Agrawal, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals*, 379 
29
  Zhang, Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 75 
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above, there is still controversy in the accounting profession over the necessity and 
effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  This study, in using a unique sample group, 
seeks to determine if the rules imposed by the act are correctly focused on the true causes 
of accounting fraud.  There is inherently a cost on firms when more regulations are 
imposed.  The auditing process becomes difficult when these rules are in place, and this 
costs firms time and money.  Of course, no one would disagree that the new rules were 
appropriate−provided they effectively addressed the true causes of fraud.  The negative 
effects of the collapse of companies such as Enron and WorldCom were catastrophic and 
therefore it is not surprising that the government stepped in to reform the rules.  But if 
empirical studies show that some of the new regulations were unnecessary, then the 
government should rethink their application because of the costs they place on 
companies.30  The ultimate objective of this study is to determine whether the data 
supports the restrictive legislation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  The implications of the 
results from this study are useful to government regulators in their approach toward rules 
for company-auditor relationship.   
 The results of this investigation show no significant correlation between a) audit 
fees and b) fees for other services from the independent auditor, and the likelihood of an 
SEC-prompted restatement.  The results do indicate a negative correlation (at the 5% 
significance level) between length of executive-auditor relationship and the likelihood of 
                                                          
30
 I. X. Zhang, "Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002," Journal of Accounting & 
Economics 44, no. 1-2 (2007), 75. 
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such a restatement.  This finding is consistent with the findings of Carcello, who defines 
tenure as length of firm-auditor relationship.31   
 
II. Literature Review & Hypotheses  
 The large amount of literature and past studies on this topic of firm-auditor 
relationship and its effect on the reliability of financial statements indicate that it is a 
topic of high interest and controversy in the accounting profession.  There are numerous 
studies which examine this relationship in different ways.  They examine, among many 
other things, the effect of auditing committee composition, corporate governance, and 
auditor tenure with the firm.  There is an underlying question present in each of the 
studies: Is there a conflict of interest inherent in an auditor’s relationship with a firm?  
The most relevant prior studies—as they relate to the study at hand—will be discussed 
briefly in this section.   
 It is not surprising that many of the past studies in this area are related to the 
connection between non-audit services from the auditor and a lack of independence, 
because one of the largest effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 dealt with this 
issue.32  In one study in the United Kingdom, a positive correlation between audit fees 
and consultancy services was determined.  This indicates that two common measures of 
firm-company relationship are correlated.  The author notes that this correlation 
approaches zero when one controls for firm specific events such as mergers, acquisitions, 
or bankruptcies.  This implies that these events most likely act as a third variable which 
                                                          
31
  Carcello, Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 55 
32
  Geiger, Auditor Tenure and Audit Reporting Failures., 54 
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causes both high audit costs and high consultancy costs from the independent auditor.  
Additionally, the results of the study indicate that high non-audit service fees are 
associated with clean audit reports—meaning that the auditor supposedly found no error 
to report.  The author proposes two potential reasons for the relationship.  First, it is 
possible that there is a lack of auditor independence.  An auditor whose independence is 
impaired “may be more inclined to give a clean audit opinion when a qualified report is, 
in fact, appropriate”.33  Firth also notes the possibility that the consultancy services were 
necessary to clear up uncertainty or disagreement prior to the audit.  He admits that, 
regretfully, the study cannot distinguish between the two possible causes, however, and 
therefore cannot conclude that high non-audit services are associated with less 
independence of the auditor.33  Another United Kingdom study by the same researcher 
sought to determine the connection between companies with high-agency costs and the 
amount of non-audit services.  Companies with high-agency costs always require 
independent auditors to approve their financial statements and are very concerned with 
reassuring their creditors and investors of the security of the company.  This study 
questions whether companies which have such a large concern with appearing honest and 
trustworthy to their investors will choose to purchase smaller amounts of non-audit 
services to be, or at least appear, independent of their auditor.  The results from the 
observation of 500 companies show that companies whose agency-cost proxies were 
higher would choose to purchase smaller amounts of non-audit services.34  These findings 
are corroborated by the results of a 2003 study.  This study looked for a connection 
between the characteristics of the audit committee and the amount of non-audit service 
                                                          
33
  Firth, Auditor-Provided Consultancy Services and their Associations with Audit Fees and Audit Opinions, 
687 
34
  Firth, The Provision of Nonaudit Services by Accounting Firms to their Audit Clients, 1-21 
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fees (as measured by the ratio of non-audit service fees to normal audit fees).  The idea 
behind this study was that firms which are wary of their appearance of independence to 
investors and creditors, as made evident by very independent auditing committees, may 
also choose to keep their non-audit service fees small to further promote the image of 
independence.  The findings in this study show a significant negative relationship 
between audit committees comprised of only independent directors (commonly 
considered healthy for independence) and non-audit service fees.35  These findings 
support the argument discussed in the introduction that the appearance of independence is 
so important for companies that they would not risk tainting this with large amounts of 
non-audit services.            
 A 2002 study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology also investigates the 
possible effects of non-audit services.  This study sought to find the connection between 
fees for auditor’s non-audit services and earnings quality.  Like the present study, this 
investigation gathered auditor fee information from proxy statements which were 
required after 2000, and presented evidence that firms which purchased more non-audit 
services from their auditor were more likely to barely meet or beat analysts’ forecasts—
an important objective for companies.  This proxy may indicate suspicious action by the 
auditor because they allowed a financial statement which conveniently just met the 
benchmarks desired by the firm’s management.  The SEC has expressed concern that the 
desire to meet analysts’ expectations and “project a smooth earnings path creates pressure 
on auditors to permit their clients to meet those objectives”.36  The authors conclude that 
their findings support the argument that the provision of non-audit services by the 
                                                          
35
  Abbott, An Empirical Investigation of Audit Fees, Nonaudit Fees, and Audit Committees*, 215-234 
36
  Frankel et al., The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings Quality, 15 
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independent auditor strengthens the economic bond between the parties.37  A related 
study by the same author examined the relationship between auditors’ fees for non-audit 
services and a) earnings management and b) market reaction to the disclosure of fees.  
The evidence in this study showed a positive correlation between non-audit fees and 
small earnings surprises, and a negative correlation between audit fees and small earnings 
surprises.  The results also show a negative correlation between fees for non-audit 
services and stock values on the day of the disclosure—though the effect is small.38   
 A 2003 study sought to determine the relationship between audit fees and non-
audit fees, and the audit reporting for stressed companies in the manufacturing industry.  
The idea behind this study is the possibility that, when companies are financially stressed 
and would highly benefit from a favorable financial statement, the amount of the fees 
paid to the auditor will encourage them to “see things the client’s way”.39  The results 
show a significant positive correlation between the amount of fees paid for audit services 
and the likelihood of receiving a going-concern modified audit opinion.  This finding 
suggests that high payments for audit services may lead auditors to give a good opinion 
for the company’s financial statements—at least for manufacturing companies.  This 
study found no such correlation for non-audit services which suggests non-audit services 
do not have an adverse effect on the judgment of independent auditors.39 
 A 2004 study by Carcello was prompted by the new SOX regulations to 
determine if mandatory firm rotation would reduce the occurrence of auditing fraud by 
limiting the length of auditor tenure with a firm.  This study examined data on firms 
                                                          
37
  Frankel, The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management, 71 
38
  Frankel et al., The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings Quality 
39
  Geiger, Auditor Tenure and Audit Reporting Failures., 53 
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which committed fraud between 1990 and 2001 by matching them with non-fraudulent 
firms and looking for a connection between independent auditor tenure and the 
occurrence of accounting fraud.  According to the results, fraudulent accounting is most 
likely to occur in the first three years of the auditor-client relationship.  No evidence from 
this study suggests that longer auditor tenure is correlated with a higher likelihood of 
accounting fraud and therefore the author of the study opposes mandatory firm rotation.40          
The dependent variable proxy for the study at hand was chosen based on its 
usefulness as an indicator of suspicious accounting behavior and also its availability.  The 
companies included in the sample all filed a restatement at some point between 2001 and 
2003.  These restatements were not called for by the internal audit team or the 
independent auditor.  In a study by Agrawal, the connection between corporate 
governance and accounting scandals was examined to see if there was a conflict of 
interest innate in some corporate governance systems which led to accounting fraud.  As 
a proxy for accounting scandals, this study used the issuance of restatements using the 
rationale that “serious accounting problems tend to be self-unraveling and force a firm to 
revise its financial statements.  Under this assumption, a restatement is synonymous with 
the incidence of a serious accounting problem”.41  The logical argument against this 
methodology would contend that restatements cannot be unequivocally considered a bad 
thing.  It is true that a restatement could be an indication of foul play by the firm, but the 
company could also have made an honest mistake in the initial statement which the firm 
or auditor later realized.  For this reason, this current study chose to take the proxy 
requirement a step further so it would be more likely that the accounting activity was 
                                                          
40
  Carcello, Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 55 
41
  Agrawal, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals*, 402 
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fraudulent.  The companies included in our sample did not call for the restatement; the 
restatement was demanded by the SEC.  It is possible, however, that the companies 
accidentally missed the issue throughout the process, though it is less likely.                   
The literature on this subject, as well as prior studies and economic intuition, led 
to the development of three hypotheses for the three variables being considered: Amount 
of audit fees, amount of fees for non-audit services, and length of relationship between 
the CEO and the independent auditing firm. 
For Audit Fees (X1): 
H1:    There will be no correlation between the amount of fees paid for audit 
services and the occurrence of an SEC-prompted restatement. 
The Carcello study discussed above indicated a correlation between audit fees and 
receiving a positive audit opinion from the independent auditor, but this study considered 
financially stressed companies only.42  A positive opinion is extremely important when a 
company is in a volatile financial situation.  One should note that the study at hand did 
not control for being in a financially stressed position.  This is unlikely to be an issue 
because it is improbable that many (if any) of the firms in the study were in dangerous 
economic positions.  Therefore, it is predicted that there will not be a correlation between 
amount of audit fees and an SEC-prompted restatement.   
 
 
                                                          
42
  Carcello, Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 55 
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For other fees from the auditor (X2): 
H2:    There will be a negative correlation between the amount of fees paid for other 
services from the independent auditor and the occurrence of an SEC-prompted 
restatement. 
The rationale behind this hypothesis is that the independent auditor does not want to risk 
this additional income from the firm by allowing a questionable restatement.  The 
spotlight of suspicion will be directed at the auditor-firm relationship in the event that 
they miss or ignore incorrect information in the original statement.43  Additionally, higher 
fees for other services could indicate a strong knowledge of the company being audited 
so mistakes are more likely to be caught by the independent auditor.44  
For CEO-auditor tenure: 
H3:    There will be a negative correlation between CEO-auditor tenure and the 
occurrence of an SEC-prompted restatement. 
A related study by Carcello for the firms from 1990-2001 showed no correlation between 
these variables.  Similarly, as with the variable discussed in the second hypothesis, there 
is an argument that longer relationship means that the auditor knows the firm and its 
management more intimately and therefore is unlikely to make a mistake.  Additionally, a 
longer relationship means that the auditor is content doing business with the firm and 
                                                          
43
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may be less likely risk that business by approving a financial they know contains an 
error.45 
 
III.    Methodology 
 The first step in this process was to select the firms for the sample group using a 
proxy for accounting fraud.  This proxy used was based on a list of fraud cases from 1995 
to 2007 from the website of Professor Caskey at UCLA Andersen School of 
Management.46  
 As discussed in the introduction, the range of years from which to gather incidents 
of fraud was intentionally short.  It included restatements from fiscal years ranging from 
2000 and 2002.  The information for the companies used was from the fiscal year prior to 
the year in which the restatement occurred as was consistent with a 1997 study by Gerety 
and Lehn.47  
 Professor Caskey’s list shows restatements for companies from this period.  The 
list indicates who prompted the restatement.  The options were: a) “Company”: This 
meant that the restatement was called for by the company’s internal auditors; b) 
“Auditor”: This meant that misstated information was either missed or ignored by the 
internal auditors but was noticed by the independent auditors and they called for the 
restatement; c) “SEC”: The misstated information was either missed or ignored by both 
the internal and external auditors and the SEC had to call for the restatement.  A previous 
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  Carcello, Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 55 
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 Caskey, Judson.  <http://personal.anderson.ucla.edu/judson.caskey/data.html 
47
  Gerety and - Lehn, The Causes and Consequences of Accounting Fraud, - 587-- 599 
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study on the effect of audit firm tenure and accounting fraud defined fraud as “being 
charged with a violation of Rule 10(b)-5 by the SEC”.48  This study, however, drew its 
sample from the years 1990-2001.  This proxy for fraud could not be used for the current 
study because the usable range of years is much shorter.  If the proxy used by Carcello 
were used in this study, the sample size would be so small that any findings could not be 
deemed statistically significant.  The final criterion for companies, whose restatements 
were prompted by the SEC and whose date of restatement fell within the desired range, 
was the exchange in which the company was traded.  Only companies traded in the 
NYSE or NASDAQ were used.  The size of this original sample group was 60 
companies.  The list also indicated whether the issue for the restatement was related to 
revenue recognition.  For ten of the companies in the final sample group, the restatement 
concerned revenue recognition.  
  The next step was to gather the desired information for each company.  This 
included: CEO tenure with as executive, audit firm tenure with the company, audit fees 
for the years desired, and fees for all other services from the independent auditors.  CEO 
name and tenure were discovered using Bloomberg’s “Management Feature”.  If the 
company was not listed in this feature then the company’s 10-K statement for the year 
was examined.  This statement includes the date when the CEO joined the firm.  Through 
Bloomberg’s “Company Filings” feature, each company’s DEF-14 proxy statement was 
examined.  This statement included name of independent auditor, audit fees paid to this 
company for the fiscal year, and fees for other services paid to this company.  Many 
companies included the year they began working with their external auditors.  If they did 
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not list this information then proxy statements from previous years were examined to 
determine the exact year the firm began using the external auditor.  “Tenure” in the study 
was the length of the CEO-auditor relationship so the lesser of CEO tenure and auditor 
tenure was used (i.e. the length of time both parties had been with the company).  “Audit 
fees” are explicitly stated in the proxy statement.  The other fee section was for 
information technology services.  For a few companies, the remaining fees were 
separated into “audit-related”, “tax-related”, and “non-audit service (NAS)” fees.  
Because only a few companies had information technology fees, and the other categories 
were not usually separated, they were all aggregated into a category called “Other Fees 
from Independent Auditor” for the data purposes.  For companies with a mid-year fiscal 
year end, an average of the two years was used.  Finally, in order to match with a firm, 
Standardized Industrial Classification (SIC) code and total assets (for the fiscal end of the 
desired year) were also obtained.  The sample size at this point was 28 companies.   
 The next step was to match each company with a company that did not have to 
issue a restatement in the period considered.  Previous studies support this as an empirical 
method because “it provides a natural control for industry and size-related effects in our 
returns analysis”.49  The companies were matched on the two criteria used in several prior 
studies.  The first criterion was industry; the matched firm needed the same first two 
digits of SIC.  The second criterion was size as defined by total assets.47  The firm with 
the same first two digits of SIC code and with the smallest absolute value for 
[Restatement firm’s total assets – non-restatement firm’s total assets] was selected as a 
match.  Using this process, the control group selection was absolutely objective.  At this 
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point, one more firm, Tyco International, was excluded from the study because there was 
no firm within its industry with similar total assets.   The data for several control 
variables was then gathered for the 27 sample firms and their matches.  This data was 
obtained from Bloomberg and included the number of employees, the amount of sales, 
and the book-to-market ratio at the end of the desired fiscal year.    
Regression 
The regression includes the variables of audit fees, fees for other services, and length of 
relationship along with several control variables. 
SEC = b0 + b1 AUDFEE + b2NAFEES + b3TENURE + b4TA + b5MKTCAP + 
b6XCHNGE + b7EMPLOY + b8BGFIVE + b9BKMKT 
Where: 
SEC = Dummy where which assigns a 1 if the company had a restatement prompted by 
the SEC and a 0 if otherwise. 
AUDFEE = Audit fees divided by total assets for year in question. 
NAFEES = Total of all other fees for services by the independent auditor, divided by 
total assets. 
TENURE = The lesser of the length (in years) of the auditing firm’s relationship with the 
firm and the CEO’s tenure at the firm as chief executive. 
TA = Natural log of the total assets in millions USD at the end of the year.  
MKTCAP = Natural log of the company’s market capitalization at the end of the fiscal 
year. 
XCHNGE = Dummy variable which assigns 1 if company was traded on NYSE and 0 if 
otherwise. 
EMPLOY = Number of employees at the fiscal year end. 
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BGFIVE = Dummy variable which assigns 1 if one of Big Five auditors and 0 if 
otherwise. 
BKMKT = The company’s book-to-market ratio at the end of the year. 
 
The Dependent Variable 
Dependent variable is a dummy value used as a proxy for possible suspicious accounting 
activity.  Companies which had restatements called for by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (meaning that the statements passed the internal and independent auditors) 
were assigned a 1.  The companies in the control group had a 0 for this value.  This proxy 
does not indicate whether the internal and independent auditors accidentally missed the 
issue that was misstated or whether the firm and auditors purposefully ignored the issue.   
Regressors 
The regressors in this study were audit fees (AUDFEE), fees paid to the auditor for other 
services (NAFEES), and length of relationship between the CEO and independent auditor 
(TENURE).  In accordance with prior studies, the units for relationship length were 
years.50  Audit fees and other fees were divided by total assets to express them as relative 
to company size.51  This is an inherent control for industry in this study because company 
matching was determined by Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code.   
 
 
                                                          
50
 Carcello, Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 10 
51
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Control Variables 
As in prior similar studies, multiple control variables were included in the regression to 
reduce omitted variable bias.  These variables were used in previous studies with similar 
regressions.  Included in this regression were control variables for size including 
variables for total assets, market cap, and number of employees.  The rationale behind 
controlling for size was that larger companies could have lengthier and more complicated 
financial statements which could cause the internal and independent auditors to miss an 
error.  A consideration for whether the company was traded on the NYSE was included 
because two prior studies mentioned stricter audit rules typical of this exchange—which 
could lead to a more time consuming and therefore expensive audit.52, 53  A variable 
representing whether or not the auditor was a Big Five auditing firm (BGFIVE) was also 
included to determine if this was correlated with the dependent variable.  A prior study 
indicates that these firms are “quality-differentiated suppliers” and suggest a negative 
relationship between retaining a Big Five firm for auditing and the incidence of fraud.54  
The final control variable was the companies’ book-to-market ratio (BKMKT) at the end 
of the fiscal year−a proxy for growth.  This variable was included as a control because 
one would expect companies that are growing at a fast rate to “face greater pressure to 
maintain high growth rates”.55  A positive relationship between book-to-market and the 
dependent variable was therefore expected.  
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IV.    Data & Results 
 The matching process was successful in that an appropriate industry peer was 
determined for all but one of the companies.  As mentioned previously, the exception was 
Tyco International, which had far more total assets than the nearest company with the 
same two-digit SIC code and therefore was excluded.  Of the 27 matched, 10 were 
matched to a company with the same four-digit SIC code.  The average difference in total 
assets for a matched pair was $233.2 million.  13 of the 27 companies, however, had a 
difference in total assets of less than $20 million and the average percentage difference in 
total assets was approximately 17%.   
 The three variables examined in this study were audit fees, fees for other services, 
and length of relationship between firm CEO and the independent audit company.  No 
correlation was predicted for amount of audit fees and the occurrence of an SEC-
prompted restatement.  A negative correlation was predicted for the amount of fees for 
other services and the occurrence of an SEC-prompted restatement.  The t-statistic, and 
corresponding p-values, for the variables of audit fees and fees for other services from the 
independent auditor did not achieve any level of significance, indicating that one cannot 
conclude that their true coefficients differ from zero.  Therefore, based on the sample 
used, this study does not indicate any correlation between any kind of fee paid to the 
independent auditor and the occurrence of an SEC-prompted restatement. 
Only one of the variables in the regression demonstrated a significant correlation 
with the occurrence of an SEC-prompted restatement.  The regression shows a 
correlation, right at the 5% significance level, between length of the CEO-auditor 
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relationship and the occurrence of a restatement prompted by the SEC.  Influenced by the 
results of past studies, the researcher in this investigation correctly hypothesized a 
negative correlation between CEO-auditor tenure and the likelihood of an SEC-prompted 
restatement.  The coefficient for the variable of length of relationship is -0.041, the t-
statistic is -2.00 and the corresponding p-value is 0.051.    
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Table 1.  Companies included in the sample group and their matches based on SIC code and total assets  
 
 
Restatement prompted by SEC Ticker Fiscal Year SIC Total Assets ($ mil) Matched Control Group Ticker Fiscal Year SIC Total Assets ($ mil) Difference in Assets Percentage diff.
HOMESTAKE MINING HM 2000 1041 1,419.38$                            SOUTHERN COPPER CORP SCCO    2000 1021 1,770.56$                           351.18$                              24.74%
CONAGRA FOODS INC CAG 2000 2038 12,295.80$                          SARA LEE CORP SLE     2000 2053 11,611.00$                         684.80$                              5.57%
ANIKA THERAPEUTICS INC ANIK 2000 2836 28.98$                                EPIX PHARMACEUTICALS INC EPIX    2000 2835 29.68$                               0.70$                                  2.42%
LECROY CORP LCRY 2000 3825 100.85$                              BADGER METER INC BMI     2000 3824 98.02$                               2.83$                                  2.80%
BRIGHTPOINT INC CELL 2000 4812 687.79$                              GENERAL COMMUNICATION INC-A GNCMA   2000 4813 679.01$                             8.78$                                  1.28%
PAULSON CAPITAL CORP PLCC 2000 6211 31.55$                                SIEBERT FINANCIAL CORP SIEB    2000 6211 40.64$                               9.09$                                  28.82%
PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES INC PPD 2000 8111 77.77$                                FTI CONSULTING INC FCN     2000 8111 146.13$                             68.37$                                87.91%
ZILA INC ZILA 2001 2834 75.60$                                DIADEXUS INC DDXS    2001 2834 53.37$                               22.23$                                29.40%
PAR PHARMACEUTICAL COS INC PRX 2001 2834 216.93$                              NABI BIOPHARMACEUTICALS NABI    2001 2836 314.62$                             97.70$                                45.04%
GEMSTAR-TV GUIDE INTL INC GMST 2001 3651 9,341.51$                            MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC MU      2001 3674 8,363.20$                           978.31$                              10.47%
NVIDIA CORP NVDA 2001 3674 1,016.90$                            FINISAR CORPORATION FNSR    2001 3674 1,030.00$                           13.09$                                1.29%
PHOTON DYNAMICS INC PHTN 2001 3823 158.64$                              DIONEX CORP DNEX    2001 3823 173.68$                             15.05$                                9.49%
XEROX CORP XRX 2001 3861 27,645.00$                          RAYTHEON COMPANY RTN     2001 3812 26,636.00$                         1,009.00$                            3.65%
ALLIANT ENERGY CORP LNT 2001 4911 6,237.93$                            ONEOK INC OKE     2001 4923 5,853.30$                           384.62$                              6.17%
CRAFTMADE INTERNATIONAL INC CRFT 2001 5063 59.13$                                MOORE HANDLEY INC MHCO    2001 5072 49.03$                               10.10$                                17.07%
RESTORATION HARDWARE INC RSTO 2001 5719 233.87$                              COST PLUS INC/CALIFORNIA CPWM    2001 5719 252.87$                             18.99$                                8.12%
WILLIAMS-SONOMA INC WSM 2001 5719 891.93$                              TRANS WORLD ENTERTAINMENT CP TWMC    2001 5735 1,002.00$                           110.07$                              12.34%
ANNUITY AND LIFE RE HOLDINGS ANNRF 2001 6311 2,310.77$                            MERCURY GENERAL CORP MCY     2001 6331 2,316.54$                           5.77$                                  0.25%
TALX CORP TALX 2001 7373 34.00$                                INTERACTIVE INTELLIGENCE INC ININ    2001 7372 43.51$                               9.51$                                  27.98%
GERBER SCIENTIFIC INC GRB 2001 7373 478.41$                              COGNEX CORP CGNX    2001 7373 406.90$                             71.50$                                14.95%
ENTERASYS NETWORKS INC ETS 2001 7373 750.04$                              CERNER CORP CERN    2001 7372 712.30$                             37.74$                                5.03%
EDISON SCHOOLS INC EDSN 2001 8211 394.50$                              DEVRY INC DV      2001 8221 391.68$                             2.82$                                  0.72%
MASSEY ENERGY CO MEE 2002 1222 2,241.43$                            ARCH COAL INC ACI     2002 1222 2,182.81$                           58.62$                                2.62%
NANOPHASE TECHNOLOGIES CORP NANX 2002 3999 20.01$                                RONSON CORP RONCQ   2002 3999 12.89$                               7.12$                                  35.60%
IDT CORP-CLASS B IDT 2002 4813 1,607.92$                            YOUNG BROADCASTING INC-A YBTVQ   2002 4833 892.58$                             715.34$                              44.49%
UNUM GROUP UNM 2002 6321 45,259.50$                          AFLAC INC AFL     2002 6321 45,058.00$                         201.50$                              0.45%
CPI CORP CPY 2002 7221 172.72$                              MAC-GRAY CORP TUC     2002 7215 174.63$                             1.90$                                  1.10%
AMERCO UHAL 2002 7513 3,732.32$                            DOLLAR THRIFTY AUTOMOTIVE GP DTG     2002 7514 2,100.37$                           1,631.94$                            43.72%
AVERAGE 233.17$                    16.91%
 30   
 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic P-Value 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
AUDFEE 0.0000395 0.0000353 1.12 0.269 [-0.0000315, 0.0001105] 
OTHER 0.0000355 0.0000472 0.75 0.457 [-0.0000596, 0.0001306] 
TENURE -0.041096* 0.0205004 -2.00 0.051 [-0.0823611, 0.0001692] 
TA 0.0102244 0.1019385 0.10 0.921 [-0.1949671, 0.2154158] 
MKTCAP -0.0002963 0.0878193 -0.00 0.997 [-0.1770673, 0.1764746] 
XCHNGE 0.0379667 0.1673464 0.23 0.822 [-0.2988841, 0.3748175] 
EMPLOY -1.79e-07 3.55e-06 -0.05 0.960 [-7.33e-06, 6.97e-06] 
BGFIVE 0.0677841 0.317318 0.21 0.832 [-0.570944, 0.7065121] 
BKMKT -0.0099403 0.0310772 -0.32 0.751 [-0.0724955, 0.0526149] 
_CNSTNT 0.4803447 0.3683867 1.30 0.199 [-0.2611794, 1.221869] 
SEC = b0 + b1 AUDFEE + b2NAFEES + b3TENURE + b4TA + b5MKTCAP + b6XCHNGE + b7EMPLOY + b8BGFIVE + b9BKMKT 
 
Table 2.   Regression results 
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V. Conclusion 
 This study was prompted by the possible existence of an auditor conflict of 
interest.  The study questioned whether the economic bond formed between the 
independent auditor and its client, through audit fees, fees for other services, and a long 
length of relationship, could cause the auditing form to either miss or ignore errors or 
irregularities in the initial financial statement, leading the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to call for a restatement.  The results do not indicate any correlation between 
either audit fees or fees for other services, and the occurrence of an SEC-prompted 
restatement.  The findings show a significant negative correlation between one of the 
three variables investigated, length of CEO-auditor relationship, and the occurrence of an 
SEC-prompted restatement.  This finding corroborates the findings of similar prior 
studies.  This study hypothesized a negative correlation between these variables using the 
rationale that length of relationship will a) increase an auditor’s knowledge of the client 
so they are less likely to miss an error in the firm’s financial statements and/or b) an 
auditor knows the difficulty of initially obtaining, and retaining a business relationship 
for a long period of time, and therefore would not want to risk this relationship by 
willfully allowing the client to disclose untrue information in a financial statement.  A 
company risks its professional reputation when it signs off on an inaccurate financial 
statement, and auditors who develop a poor reputation for honesty are less appealing to 
management teams who want their companies’ financial statements to be received as 
honest and reliable.56  History has shown the severe consequences for firms, like Arthur 
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Andersen, who violate accounting rules and principles and consequently destroy their 
reputation in the industry.57 
 The idea behind using SEC-prompted restatements as the dependent variable 
proxy was that, by accident or not, both the company and the independent auditor missed 
the piece of inaccurate information in the original statement.  This study does not assert 
that these companies purposefully misstated information and then pressured their auditors 
to do the same.  Further investigation into the actual events or misstatements which 
caused the restatements in the sample group could either increase or decrease the 
meaningfulness of this study.  For instance, if a lengthy investigation of each restatement 
in the sample group reveals that the majority of the incidents involved indictment, and 
possibly conviction by the SEC then one can more strongly assert that these were cases of 
purposeful manipulation of financial statements.  
 The usefulness of this study lies in its ability to provide recommendations to 
lawmakers, financial market regulators, and the public, concerning auditor independence.  
These parties are interested in creating a system which will ensure that the disasters—
partly caused by accounting scandals—of Enron, WorldCom, and many other companies 
will never occur again.  Legislation introduced after these events attempted to ensure the 
independence of auditors by including measures designed to limit the strength of the 
economic bond between the firms.  This study, to the extent that its proxies and sample 
size can provide insight, indicates that there is no correlation between a) audits fees and 
b) fees for other services, and the occurrence of a SEC-prompted restatement.  The study 
also indicates a significant negative correlation between the length of CEO-auditor 
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relationship and the occurrence of a SEC-prompted restatement—which counters the 
argument that a longer relationship means the integrity of the independent auditor is more 
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